Does the media encourage terrorism?

In this essay I will try to answer the complex essay topic “if mass media encourage terrorism”. I will begin with defining the words mass media and furthermore terrorism. The latter word is widely used in today’s globalised world and covered tabloids worldwide several times.
There are several views on media and terrorism, but there is a common academic view that; getting the political statement behind terrorism through is more important, than the act itself. In this essay I will examine if media encourages terrorism or if media is the cause of terrorism and without it there would be no terror? This relationship between media and terrorism is highly contested and a debated political issue. Also known, terrorism is a low cost and high-efficiency weapon to fight an otherwise superior enemy.
In short, media is not the essential factor for terrorist acts but an instrument to change the likelihood of terrorist occurrence and the direct cost the actual act generate. One could argue, on the other hand though that, terrorism would occur even if the media did not exist.

According to Cooper (1991) mass media’s function is to inform and be accessible to all citizens. It also plays an important role when it comes to educating other individuals. Thirdly, media should be a platform for public political discourse. As being the “watchdog” and give publicity to governmental and political institutions, media’s influence over the public sphere is massive. Public opinion can therefore only matter to the extent that the acts of whoever holds supreme power are made available for public scrutiny, meaning how far they are visible, ascertainable, accessible, and hence accountable (Bobbio, 1987, p.83). As Mikhail Gorbachev states, the media must have “a degree of ‘openness’ surrounding the activities of the political class if the ‘public opinions’ of the people are to have any bearing on decision-making” (Cooper, 1991).
Thus media style it selves as the ‘voice of the people’ are more effective at ensuring democratic accountability than the arrangements formally designated for this purpose (Street, 2001, p.7). The mass media on the other hand, does not simply cover observable events and report facts; it animates them by turning them into narratives with plots and actors (Street, 2005, p.36). Two good examples of this is, terrorism that appears as nothing more than ‘psychotic behavior’ and enemies of the state tend to demonize in ways that, reinforce their illegitimacy and deny rationality to their actions like as Saddam Hussein, portrayed as a modern ‘Hitler’ (Said, 2000).

For the second concept to be explained I believe a good starting point is to recognize that terrorism, unlike liberalism, communism or conservatism is not an ideology but a method; a method of political violence. Historically, the first terrorist act was first seen during the French Revolution. It has been a tactic utilized by a wide array of ideological movements: states, ethno-nationalists, religious and millenarian movements, extreme left wing, right-wing groups, single issue fanatics such as anti-abortionists and animal-rights movements, have all variously engaged in terrorism at certain times (Wilkinson, 2003 and Dannreuter, 2007).

Another common definition of terrorism – is an act of violence for political means and closely similar to the classical military proposition of Karl von Clausewitz (1976) that: war is not a mere act of policy but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity by other means. This, in contrast to the framework of terrorism, of the perceived inability to reach one’s goal through more conventional means. On the other hand “one’s mans terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter” (Dannreuter 2007, p.167) highlights the divide between those who see terrorism as malicious but others as striving for justice of the cause it promotes. Furthermore, terrorism always has a political nature (Brown, 2003, p.281). It seeks political change and has its roots in justice or at least someone’s perception of justice. The method target innocents and as Rapoport argues the method is a fourth wave of following three earlier phases in which terrorism emanated from the breakup of empires, decolonization, and anti-Americanism (Rapoport, 2004, p.282).

However, international security has changed in nature after the Cold War. The Shift of global focus and attention from East-West to the North-South axis, along with the growing concern and skepticism about the states exploitation of other countries natural-resources. Using economics of warfare to analyze terrorism is simpler than one might expect. Stahel (2002) outlines two kinds of warfare, asymmetric and dissymmetric. The concept of asymmetric warfare contains ideas of fighting a war against a superior enemy. It involves classical theorems of guerilla warfare such as espionage, violent resistance, non-violent-resistance, sabotage, electronic and information warfare. Dissymmetric warfare is the product of employment of massive force by the stronger military power against the weaker opponent in a military conflict. These broad inclusive terms denote that two sides in a conflict have such drastically different strengths and weaknesses that they resort to drastically different (thus asymmetric) tactics to achieve relative advantage. This theory firmly explains terrorism behavior as rational if one takes the state as the superior actor and the terrorist as the inferior (Betts, 2002). Terrorists are consciously conducting asymmetric warfare.
Having established that economics play a large role when it comes to terrorism we can then conclude that the statement of victory in terms of an inferior actor lies in inflicting costs higher than the opposition are willing to accept. Hence, warfare must have low-cost and high-efficiency in order to achieve maximum impact (Bell, 1978).
However, success or failure of a terrorist attack is therefore dependant on the monetary value of the act itself (see Landes, 1978: in Sander and Hartley, 1995).
Terrorism occurs when the expected utility is greater than the utility expected without terrorism. We can then conclude that as mass media is not an independent factor by itself, it must be examined in its ability to either change the estimate of success and failure or increase or decrease the monetary value of the outcomes. It can be said that investigation is whether media can change the expected utility from terrorism thus increasing the possibility for it to occur.

The question then lies if there is a possibility of media to effect on terrorist decision-making, is this possibility crucial for the occurrence of terrorism?
The true cost of terrorism is in term of losses to the superior actor and in collateral damage can be altered by the media. If initial costs have heavy impact upon public opinion, causing popular opinion to change it, can be said that, there is a virtual cost added upon the true costs. This also argues a case for censorship of the media if the loss is not made public at all it only carries the purely psychical cost.
Media can create additional cost of terrorism upon superior actors, but is this cost vital to the act itself, is for instance the media’s effect calculated when executing the act of terror? If there were no media, would the attack still take place?
Strategies conclude that utility expected from attacks are greater when choosing asymmetric warfare (Lee, 1988: in Sander and Hartley, 1995).

As terrorism can be analyzed as war both in technical and political terms, interesting developments can be made. Applying our theory of terrorism on Warden’s (1995) warfare principles, that an inferior actor should be attacking from the middle and out. According to the theory's idea the circle with its five subcircles reflect the impact of the attack. The other circle affect fielded military, then population, furthermore, infrastructure, then system essentials and finally leadership achievement would be the maximum impact.





In this perspective, when terrorists attack upon a target they are not doing so solely because it carriers a media value, they are instead attacking an integral part of an enemy in order to inflict maximum costs. Looking at 9/11 we can see that the attack was aimed at all five levels of Wardens model.
Viewing terrorism from this model, we can conclude that attacks are not because they hold media value, but because they are strategically sound. Of course, impact was enormous, but this is a direct effect of an attack trying to achieve maximum cost. One other important issue to elaborate on is that all terrorist groups from Al-Qaeda to ETA have one trait in common: none commits actions randomly or senselessly. Each wants maximum publicity to be generated by its objectives. In the words of the late Dr Frederick Hacker, a psychiatrist and noted authority in terrorism, terrorists seek to ‘frighten and by frightening to dominate and control. They want to impress. They play to and for an audience, and solicit audience participation(Hoffman, 1998). Terrorism, therefore, may be seen as a violent act that is conceived specifically to attract attention and then, through the publicity it generates, to communicate a message, ‘There is no other way for us’ a leader of the United Red Army terrorist group once explained. ‘Violent actions…are shocking. We want to shock people; everywhere…It is our way of communicating with the people (Hoffman, 1998). The modern news media, as the principal conduit of information about such acts, thus play a vital part in the terrorist calculus. Indeed, without the media’s coverage the act’s impact is arguable wasted, remaining narrowly confined to the immediate victims of the attack rather then reaching the wider ‘target audience’ at whom the terrorist violence is actually aimed (ibid). With this media coverage the terrorist can reach a larger audience, also increase the chance of political change. ‘Terrorism is theatre’, Jenkins famously said in his 1974 paper, explaining how ‘terrorist attacks are often carefully choreographed to attract the attention of the electronic media and the international press’ (ibid).

After 9/11 which led to around 3000 fatalities the countries of the industrialized West had enjoyed the reassurance of the great power peace, with the end of the Cold War appearing to bring an end to the long historical era of the constant threat of, and preparation for large-scale interstate war. Kirshheimer’s ‘end of ideology’, Fukuyama’s ‘end of history’ and Huntington’s ‘Clash of civilizations’ all commonly mention the change the world is about to face or is already facing. Furthermore, all states – whether authoritarian or democratic, traditional or modern, religious or secular – fear being their targets. After the 9/11 attack Bush led America towards the ‘war on terror’; one root for United States failure that was the assumption that the terrorist attacks increasing is primarily due to the visceral and unconditional hatred of the US and its values. The second belief that the principal reason for the US vulnerability was its unwillingness to assert the freedom consonant with its power and interest, and its subjection to a variety of constraints, including the demands of allies, multilateral regimes and institutions, and international law (Dannreuter 2007, p.166). This was the start of a long lasting strategy that may eventually lead into the worldwide economic meltdown we face today.
The concepts of ‘us’ versus ‘them’ have put media in an influencing role towards the popular media. With the increasing number of individuals reading the newspaper due to the Internet, media play a more vital role when communicating the method of terrorism than before. The American media’s coverage of the hijacking of TWA flight 847 by Lebanese Shi’a terrorist in 1985 amply confirms that media coverage affect people’s emotions, public opinion but also highlights the censorship the media produce with help from the government (Hoffman, 1998). Indeed, on average two-thirds of NBC, CBS and ABC’s broadcasting news was covering the hijacking. Their ‘real news’ was put aside to increase the public hysteria about the terrorist threat the world is facing today (Hoffman 1998). Like today the terrorists knew that they could proceed ‘to challenge America, to humiliate Americans’, because they knew that the supine media would provide them with unlimited publicity and perhaps even some form of advocacy (Chomsky, 1986). Media’s ability to encourage terrorist may be limited but for sure one could argue that the actual impact and cost the terrorist act will generate is depending on the media’s average percentage of news covering the acts itself.

It is not a coincidence that terrorist aim their weapons towards United States and its allies because responses to 9/11 similarly suggest that, while there is recognition that a collective international response to Al-Qaeda is essential, it is states, rather than non-state institutions and groups, who coordinate and oversee this response (Dannreuter 2007, p.26). We can see that terrorist attacks has increased since the 9/11 but relatively seen; is this media’s or United States foreign policy strategy fault?



When President Clinton left office his popularity was 68 % among the American citizens. George W. Bush’s popularity on the other hand, is only 23 % and still decreasing. One could argue that Maslow’s hierarchy of basic needs were financial resources is number one to affect individual behaviour. Since the “war on terror” and the crash of the United States house market may be the causes of the economic and financial meltdown therefore, public opinion may agree to sacrifice national security but actually supply your families with food on their tables?
On the other hand, have liberal democracies been particularly vulnerable when weakened by ethnic or religious conflict, by military defeat, by major economic crisis or by an erosion of popular support for democratic values. These states face a much greater economic and social stress. Their difficulties are exacerbated by shortages of resources, expertise and popular legitimacy, and such regimes are particularly open to terrorist attacks (Wilkinson, 1974).

However, governments and mass media from past lessons of terrorist campaigns show that it would be wise to bear in mind certain fundamental ground rules. They should not, for instance, blackmail or intimidate terrorists but secondly assure the citizens that the state can provide security for its population. Lastly and most important by the government and media must seek to avoid alienating the support of the mass of the population (Wilkinson, 1974). Following these ground rules that Wilkinson praise will help the state not to weaken its position.

In conclusion media do not have the affect on terrorists to stop terrorize the state. Their method is working to some extent especially affecting one’s target state foreign affairs strategy and fulfills its political change the individual seeking or aiming for. On the other hand media one could argue, do affect the actual impact of Warden’s five levels of destruction. Furthermore, if terrorists seek media attention and are given after an attack, their act will be seen as successful so, by not outnumber other ‘real news’ media, have the ability to affect the scale of an attack. With today’s worldwide Internet accessibility to anyone at anytime the support and especially funding of terrorism acts may increase. On the other hand Muslims for instance in Afghanistan where the literacy level is low can not see the difference from attacking a state for a religious or political purpose. But, however, the ‘CNN affect’ in other words may increase the number of casualties from a terrorist attack if international press exaggerating the hatred towards terrorism and ‘war on terror’. Out of this it is clear that media as the ‘voice of the people’ encourages the scale of the terrorist attack but not the actual terrorist attack in itself.